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The paper addresses the role which national attitudes play in terrorist threat perception and in the choice of specific 
counterterrorism strategies. Study 1 shows that participants higher on nationalism tend to perceive the threat of terrorism 
as more serious than participants lower on nationalism. Moreover, we found that nationalism mediated the relationship 
between the perceived terrorist threat and the support for tough domestic policies, even at the expense of considerable 
limitation of civil liberties. Study 2 confirms the link between the perceived terrorism threat and the support for suspension 
of civil liberties. Nevertheless, when terrorism was seen in terms of crime rather than in terms of war, the mediating role of 
nationalism disappeared. The results contribute to a better understanding of the process whereby the perception of one’s 
own national group and the perception of one’s own nation-state translate into specific reactions triggered by external 
threats. 
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Introduction
The threat of terrorism has many faces. Sometimes 
the threat is perceived as considerably salient and serious, 
sometimes it appears distant and abstract (e.g. Huddy, 
Khatib & Capelos, 2002; McCauley, 2004; Podolski, 
2004; Goodwin, Willson, & Gaines, 2005; Paez Rovira, 
Martinez-Sanchez, & Rime, 2004). Numerous studies have 
confirmed also that the threat of terrorism is a source of 
various negative individual and social consequences. For 
example, it can debilitate psychological functioning and 
induce fears and anxieties, which Zimbardo (2003) labeled 
“Pre-Traumatic Stress Syndrome” (see also: Somer, Tamir, 
Maguen, & Litz, 2005). On the intergroup level, the threat 
of terrorism increases intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism 
and xenophobia (e.g. Echebarria–Echabe, & Fernandez-
Guede, 2005; for similar results see: Bar-Tal & Labin, 
2001; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Jahav, 2005). Moreover, 
Huddy and colleagues (2005) have shown that, with the 
increase in intensity of the perception of terrorist threats, 
people become more supportive of policies that restrict civil 
rights of social groups that are commonly associated with 
terrorist activity (e.g. Arabs, Muslims) or even of citizens 
in general (see also: Davis & Silver, 2004). 
Kruglanski and colleagues (Kruglanski, Crenshaw, 
Post, & Victoroff, 2007) suggest that the perception of 
the threat and preferences for different counterterrorist 
reactions depend upon a specific framing of terrorism. 
According to the authors, counterterrorist reactions can be 
perceived as (1) war, (2) law enforcement, (3) containment 
of a social epidemic, and (4) prejudice reduction. In the 
first case, terrorism is seen as an evil to be destroyed; in 
the second, as a crime to be punished; in the third,  as a 
disease to be cured; and in the forth, as a sort of cultural 
misunderstanding to be explained and solved.
The four counterterrorism metaphors not necessarily 
should be orthogonal and in fact in most cases they are not. 
More than that – as far as the applicability aspect is concerned 
they even should not be treated as separate policies, due 
to the most efficient counter-terrorism strategies usually 
require high flexibility and multi-level responding. Instead, 
they embrace differing forms of prevention or direct fight 
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against terrorism. Thus, while war and law enforcement 
metaphors focus on actual perpetrators of terrorism, the 
epidemiological metaphor addresses the sources and 
mechanisms of spreading terrorist ideologies. Prejudice 
reduction metaphor in turn brings attention to specific 
intergroup relations, the attitudes the groups declare, and 
behaviour towards each other.
While Kruglanski and his colleagues refer to the 
metaphors for the way terrorism is framed in public 
discourse, politicians use them in order to convince people 
to certain actions. However, we are interested for whom 
such metaphors are, or can be convincing. The self-
imposing answer is that preference for reacting one way 
or another should be dependent upon how people perceive 
terrorist groups and terrorism itself, and indeed there 
have been studies showing the link between picturing the 
image of a terrorist and preference for specific reactions 
(McCauley, 2007; Pronin, Kennedy, & Butsch, 2006). It 
has been revealed, for example, that seeing terrorism as an 
act of war led to preference for fighting against terrorists 
as if they were enemy soldiers. On the other hand, seeing 
terrorism as an act of crime evoked a tendency to prosecute 
and isolate terrorists as any others perpetrators of socially 
unacceptable and unlawful deeds against the community. 
But what happens if the terrorist image is too abstract 
to constitute a stable source of attitudes towards the 
phenomenon of terrorism? This is frequently the case in 
countries that have not been the target of an attack. We would 
like to ask whether in these countries, where people cannot 
draw on the established image of a threatening outgroup 
in choosing a preference for a certain counteraction, 
will they draw merely on their concerns regarding the 
ingroup and their image of it? Would people with different 
representations of their own community also differ on 
views to what degree the community is threatened and 
how it should be protected?  In other words, we would like 
to pose the following question: Is there any link between 
perception of and attitudes towards one’s own society 
and perception of terrorist threat along with a preference 
or support for certain counteraction? It brings us to the 
question of national attitudes. 
National attitudes and perception of terrorism threat
What attracted us to this question is that nowadays 
terrorism is usually framed in an international context, and, 
as a result, terrorist threat is frequently approached from 
a national perspective. Commonly posed questions are: 
“is my country a possible target for terrorist attack?”, or 
“may it become one?” Similar questions, raised in different 
countries, are concerned with the security of the respective 
state – the state seen as a separate entity – a land limited by 
national borders. Nevertheless, people bear quite different 
attitudes towards the nations to which they belong, or 
generally, even towards the idea of the nation, along with 
its role, duties and integrity (cf. e.g. Anderson, 1983; 
Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986; Hobsbawm, 1992). And all of 
this usually translates into their feeling of security, as well 
as into their ideas on how the nation/state should act in the 
face of external threats. 
There are studies suggesting that the perception of 
terrorist threat may be related to people’s national attitudes. 
The data collected in countries that have suffered terrorist 
attacks show that, following attacks, issues concerning 
national attitudes gained in importance. For example, in 
the United States after 9/11, nationalism increased both at 
the level of expression and as the feeling of community (Li 
& Brewer, 2004); identification with the country likewise 
increased (Moskalenko, McCauley, & Rozin, 2006). 
Furthermore, the threat to national security gave rise to 
support for government decisions, from 29% (March 2001) 
to 64% (September 25-27, 2001), and people started to 
highlight matters concerning security, defence and foreign 
affairs as the most important for the nation/state (Chanley, 
2002). 
Other studies also suggest that terrorist threat increases 
national sentiments. In a quasi-experimental study, we 
measured the level of national attitudes among Poles after 
the bombing in London in July 2005 (Kossowska, Golec de 
Zavala, Sekerdej, & Kubik, 2010). The data were collected 
in London (the place of the attack), Plymouth (UK), and in 
Krakow (Poland). The latter two cities have never suffered 
from a terrorist attack. Not surprisingly, Poles living in 
the UK expressed a higher level of perceived terrorist 
threat than Poles living in Krakow, Poland. Interestingly 
though, Poles living in London showed the highest level of 
national attitudes and perceived ingroup cohesion, stronger 
identification with the Polish national group, and increased 
level of the feeling of human solidarity directed primarily 
towards the national ingroup. Simultaneously, the findings 
confirm that emigrants residing in another country still 
perceive their national group as their ingroup. These results 
corroborate earlier findings indicating that establishing 
and maintaining positive relations with others, particularly 
with the members of an ingroup, is one of the important 
adaptive mechanisms people use to deal with death anxiety 
(Florian, Miculincer, & Hirschberger, 2002; Taubman-Ben-
Ari, Findler, & Miculincer, 2002; Mikulincer, Florian, & 
Hirschberger, 2003;Śmieja, Kałaska, & Adamczyk, 2006). 
National attitudes and reactions to terrorism
As regards the reactions to the threat, commonly posed 
questions are “what does my country do about it?” or “what 
can my country do about it?” And then people support or do 
not support different actions or solutions, which are being 
drawn up, or at least approved, again, at a governmental, 
i.e. national, level. Therefore, in the case of preference for 
certain counterterrorism actions, national attitudes can also 
play an important role. 
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There is a body of research showing that nationalism 
is linked with less tolerance for otherness, both external 
and internal (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Pick, 1997; Blank 
& Schmidt, 2003); support for tough or even aggressive 
international policies and feelings of national superiority 
(Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Schatz & Staub, 1997; 
Sidanius, Feshbach, Levine, & Pratto, 1997; Federico, 
Golec, & Dial, 2005), as well as racist- and fascist-based 
prejudices (Heaven, Rajab, & Ray, 1985; Staub, 1997; 
Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendoorn, 2003;  Leyens, Cortes, 
Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, 2003). Therefore, 
one can suspect that nationalism would be a reason for 
subscribing to confrontational metaphor rather than to 
one of prejudice reduction, according to Kruglanski`s and 
others’ (2007) classification of the way people perceive 
terrorism and counterterrorism. Additionally, as shown in 
other studies, nationalism correlates negatively with the 
support for civil liberties (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; 
Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2006). Hence, one can 
expect stronger support for state interference in people’s 
lives, justified by matters of security.  
Nevertheless, Kruglanski and colleagues (2007), 
exploring confrontational metaphors, point out different 
implications for retaliatory or preventive actions that ensue 
from distinction in perceiving terrorism either as war or law 
enforcement efforts. In other words, the authors suggest 
that the character of an undertaken counteraction varies 
depending on if terrorism is seen as an evil to be destroyed 
or a crime to be punished. Strong national attitudes, due to 
their relation with rigid thinking and one-sided perception of 
conflicts, may then result in perceiving terrorism prevention 
in a collective way, as “us” versus “them”, i.e. in terms of 
an open intergroup conflict. For that reason we suppose 
that “nationalists” are more likely to perceive coping with 
terrorism in terms of conventional warfare, i.e. “open and 
declared, hostile armed conflict between states or nations” 
(Webster’s Dictionary, 2008), and choose the means of 
response accordingly; they will also support the restriction 
of civil liberties as another means of strengthening national 
security and protecting societies from the threat of future 
terrorist activities. 
There are some findings suggesting that this may indeed 
be the case. For example, the supporters of the invasion of 
Iraq, as a reaction to the threat of terrorism, were high on 
nationalism (Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005). People high 
on nationalism were also likely to support military actions 
in Afghanistan and to ignore or play down the human 
costs of the war (McFarland & Mathews, 2005; Cohr, 
Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005). Likewise, as was 
shown by Huddy and colleagues, in America, older people 
and Republicans (presumably higher on nationalism) in 
comparison to younger people and Democrats (presumably 
lower on nationalism) more often support retaliatory 
actions and a tough policy towards terrorism (Huddy, 
Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002). The findings suggest 
a relationship between nationalism and the preference for 
armed and comprehensive conflict resolution strategies 
aiming at complete neutralisation of “the enemy.”
However, almost all of the findings cited above on 
the link between the perception of terrorist threat, the 
preferred counterterrorism actions and national attitudes 
were collected in countries that had already suffered from 
terrorist attacks. Likewise, the public rhetoric for war 
had additionally strengthened people’s identification with 
their own nation on the one hand, and induced support 
for aggressive reaction on the other. Nonetheless, it raises 
the question whether people who were initially high on 
nationalism were simultaneously susceptible to such 
rhetoric and prone to see the terrorist threat in terms of an 
open intergroup conflict from the beginning. Our goal is 
then to test the impact of those initial “pre-war” national 
attitudes on perception of the terrorist-provoked threat, 
along with the support for the relevant reactions. 
Overview of the study
Although Poland has never been a real target of 
international terrorism, the issue of terrorist threat is 
undoubtedly a subject of public debate due, for example, to 
Poland’s involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
as well as the recent negotiations over the location of the 
proposed US Missile Defence System. Reports on terrorist 
attacks in Russia and former Soviet Union can also play 
a certain role in the perception of possible terrorist threat 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Bearing in mind that 
when terrorist attacks actually happen, people start to 
believe more in their own state, support even its radical 
counterterrorism strategies and focus on security, we 
asked whether in a situation where terrorist attacks have 
not actually happened, national attitudes can  mediate the 
relationship between the perceived threat and the support 
for the state’s counterterrorism actions. Moreover, we asked 
whether high levels of nationalism lead to the perception of 
counterterrorism as a “global war on terrorism”. 
We addressed these questions in two consecutive studies. 
In study 1 we examined the relationship between national 
attitudes, the perception of terrorist threat, and the support 
for the restriction of civil liberties as a counterterrorism 
strategy. As regards terrorist threat perception, we were 
interested both in its intensity and in what aspects of 
peoples’ lives it touched upon. As for counterterrorism 
strategy, we focused primarily on its internal dimension, 
which is concerned with the means of security the state 
should or should not impose on its residents and visitors, 
certainly at the expense of some limitation of civil liberties. 
Incidentally, the issue of social control as counterterrorism 
strategy has been recently present in public discourse in 
Poland. Poles, as many other peoples around the world, 
have begun to debate about the problem of counterterrorism 
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itself – about the possible threat it poses to the spirit of 
democracy and about how far the state should go in efforts 
to protect national and personal security (Michnik, 2009; 
Joyner, 2004; Mandel & Dhami, 2005). 
 As mentioned above, drawing on the data from countries 
which already suffered from terrorist attacks, and assuming 
that nationalism is frequently related to the support for 
aggressive conflict resolution strategies, we hypothesized 
that strong national attitudes induce decisive support for 
social control and restrictions of civil liberties. Along this 
line of thinking, we assumed also that nationalism mediated 
the relationship between the threat of terrorism and support 
for the restriction of civil liberties. 
In study 2 we tested the role of perception of terrorism 
as war vs. law enforcement issue in terms of the relationship 
between nationalism and the support for restrictions of civil 
liberties. Drawing on the findings suggesting that nationalism 
is frequently linked with rigid thinking and one-sided 
perception of conflicts, we hypothesized that people high 
on nationalism tended to see counterterrorism as war rather 
than crime fighting. By the same token, they see terrorists 
groups as an enemy army to be destroyed rather than a gang 
of criminals to be detained, judged and sent to prison as 
anybody else is who violates the law. Besides, assuming 
that war is usually understood as a conflict between states 
or nations, it is more often perceived in national terms than 
crime is, which is usually understood as an internal problem 
for states to address, we hypothesized that nationalism 
mediated the relationship between perception of terrorism 
and the support for restriction of civil liberties but only for 
participants whose view of counter-terrorism was based on 
a “war metaphor”.
 In order to avoid bias of research among one particular 
social and occupational group we tested our hypotheses 
on two different samples; in Study 1 participants were 




Participants were eighty young professionals (52 M, 28 
F, mean age = 28.7, SD = 2.8) employed in the banking 
sector. All participants had university degrees of Master’s 
level or equivalent. 
Materials
Nationalism Scale. To assess nationalism we used 
a cumulative scale adapted from Dekker, Malova, & 
Hoogendoorn (2003), containing 24 items subsumed to 6 
subscales reflecting one neutral and five positive attitudes 
towards one’s own nation: national feeling (2 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .96; M = 5.31; SD = 1.05 e.g. “I feel I am 
Polish”), national liking (4 items, Cronbach’s α = .84; M = 
4.79; SD = .94 e.g. “I enjoy being Polish”, national pride 
(3 items, Cronbach’s α = .82; M = 3.96; SD = 1.04 e.g. 
“I’m proud to be Polish”), national preference (4 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .75; M = 3.53; SD = 1.02 e.g. “I prefer to be 
a Polish citizen more than any other citizen in the world”), 
national superiority (4 items, Cronbach’s α = .75; M = 2.41; 
SD = 1 e.g. “The Polish nationality  is the best nationality 
to have”), and finally what they called nationalism (7 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .78; M = 2.43; SD = .7 e.g. “I feel I share 
a common origin with other Polish people”, “I feel I have 
Polish blood”). For each item, responses were given on 
6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). 
All the individual subscales of positive national attitudes 
were statistically reliable and for further analysis we used 
overall scores (M = 3.43; SD = .77).    
Whereas other authors stressed orthogonality, or 
at least differentiated qualitatively nationalism from 
patriotism (cf. e.g. Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Li & 
Brewer, 2004; Blank & Schmidt, 2003), or blind patriotism 
from constructive patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 
1999), the present scale put emphasis on cumulativity. 
Although, as Dekker and his colleagues observed, “the 
various attachment appeared to correspond with some 
of our attitudes (‘constructive patriotism’ with national 
feeling, liking and pride; ‘blind patriotism’ with national 
preference; ‘nationalism’ with national superiority and 
nationalism)”, the principal aim was to delineate “a theory 
explaining variances in national attitudes” (2003, p. 368). 
Thus, drawing on the findings supporting cumulativity of 
the scale we used it as a continuous measure of national 
attitudes ranging from the least to the most belligerent 
towards outgroups. 
Perceived Terrorist Threat Scale. In order to measure this 
variable, we adopted two items from Crowson, DeBacker, 
and Thoma (2006): “I worry that I might be killed or injured 
in terrorists attack” and “I worry that someone I care about 
might be killed in a terrorist attack”. Participants answered 
on 7-point scales, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Those 
two items were highly intercorrellated (r = .85; p < .001; 
Cronbach’s α = .92). Higher scores indicated a greater level 
of perceived terrorist threat (M = 2.42, SD = .98). 
Attitudes towards restrictions of civil liberties as a 
counterterrorism strategy. To assess support for social control 
we used an adapted version of the Civil Libertarianism 
Scale developed by Crowson and colleagues (2006); from 
the 28 original items, we selected 11 that could be applied 
to the current situation in Poland. In the questionnaire 
participants expressed their approval or disapproval, on 
the scale ranging from 1 (I totally disagree) to 6 (I totally 
agree), of such practices as: “Secretly monitoring the 
activities of all people residing in Poland”, “Monitoring 
the emails of all people residing in Poland”, or “Holding 
suspected terrorists indefinitely with no trial while evidence 
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against them is being collected.” (Cronbach’s α = .89; M = 
2.54; SD = .91). 
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaire 
during a group session, which they attended voluntarily. 
Each participant received a booklet containing all the 
questionnaires in a randomized order and was told that the 
scales measured current social believes. At the end of the 
session, all participants were thanked and debriefed during 
a short discussion. 
Results & Discussion
A linear regression analysis revealed a significant 
relationship between nationalism and threat (R² = .10, 
β = .33, t = 3.09, p<.01). Thus, the results confirm that 
nationalism is linked with the perception of terrorist threat. 
Moreover, participants who scored high on the nationalism 
scale were more likely to support the suspension of civil 
liberties (R² = .34, β =.58, t = 6.28, p < .001). 
Next, in order to test our hypotheses, we performed 
mediational analyses following the procedure proposed by 
Baron & Kenny (1986) (controlling for the effects of gender 
and age). As can be seen in Figure 1, nationalism mediates the 
relationship between the threat of terrorism and acceptance 
of a reduction of civil rights as a counterterrorism strategy. 
Entering nationalism scores into the regression equation 
significantly reduced the direct effect of perceived threat 
of terrorism on the support for the social control strategy 
(Sobel test z = 3.15, p < .001).  
In conclusion, the findings of Study 1 showed that 
nationalism (1) intensifies the perception of terrorist threat, 
(2) increases the support for the restriction of civil liberties 
and (3) mediates the relationship between the perceived 
threat and the restriction of civil liberties. In study 2 we 
examined whether the mediating role of nationalism was 
the same in cases of different framing of counterterrorism 
actions. In doing so, we tested the link between nationalism 
and perception terrorism either as war or crime, as well as 
mediating role of nationalism between each of those two 
metaphors and the support of restriction of civil liberties.
STUDY 2
Participants
The participants were a hundred and thirty nine part-time 
students from the University of Education in Bielsko-Biała, 
Poland (34 M, 105 F, mean age = 23.57, SD = 6.2). 
Materials
Nationalism Scale. We used the same version of scale to 
measure nationalism as in Study 1 (M = 4.04; SD = 0.77). 
Perceived Terrorist Threat Scale. Participants completed 
the same scale as in the previous study (Cronbach’s α = .87; 
M = 3.23; SD = 1.18). 
Attitudes towards the restrictions of civil liberties as a 
counterterrorism strategy. Participants completed the same 
scale as in the previous study (Cronbach’s α =.89; M = 3.4; 
SD = 0.80).
Terrorism as war or crime. The scale was constructed 
in order to assess the individual perceptions of terrorism 
as war or crime. Twenty-two items reflecting different 
understandings of terrorism as a phenomenon, as well 
as of who terrorists are, what they are like and what 
their motivations are, were developed on the basis 
of social scientific literature on terrorism (Crenshaw, 
1998; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 
2009; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006;  McCauley, 
2006; F. Moghadam, 2005; A. Moghadam, 2003; Pape, 
2005) as well as media images of terrorism and terrorists 
(Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003). Participants stated their 
agreement with each item on 6-point scales from 1 (totally 
disagree) to 6 (totally agree). Maximum Likelihood 
Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax rotation was 
performed on the data. A scree plot analysis indicated a two-
factor solution explaining 35% of the variance (eigenvalues 
= 2.22 & 1.99; no other eigenvalues greater than 1). Two 
scales were constructed from 20 items with the strongest 
factor loadings. 
Terrorism as crime was measured by 10 items (e.g. 
“The fight against terrorism is principally the matter 
of the police”; “Terrorist attack is an act of crime” and 
“Terrorist groups are like armed criminal organizations”; 
Cronbach`s α = .81; M = 4.20; SD = .67). Terrorism as war 
variable was also measured by 10 items (e.g. “The fight 
against terrorism is principally the matter of the army”; 
“Terrorist attack is an act of declaring war” and “Terrorist 
groups are like enemy’s troops”; Cronbach`s α = .78; 
M = 3.51; SD = 0.73). The scale ran from 1 (totally disagree) 
to 6 (totally agree).
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaire 
during a group session, which they attended voluntarily. 
Each participant received a booklet containing all the 
questionnaires in a randomized order and was told that the 
Figure 1. Influence of nationalism on the relationship between perceived terrorism 
threat and preference for restrictions of civil rights as a counterterrorism strategy. 





All effects were calculated controlling for gender and age. Path coefficients are stan-
dardized regression weights.
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scales measured current social beliefs. At the end of the 
session all participants were thanked and debriefed during 
a short discussion. 
Results & Discussion
The regression analysis revealed a relationship between 
nationalism and the perception of counterterrorism as war 
(R² = .06, β = .25, t = 2.94, p < .005), whereas no such link 
was found in the case of perception of counterterrorism 
as crime. Thus, the results confirm that people high on 
nationalism tended to see counterterrorism as war rather 
than crime.
Furthermore, in order to obtain a clearer picture of the 
relationships between the variables of greatest theoretical 
interest, we conducted standardized multiple regressions 
entering gender, age, perceived threat, perception of 
terrorism as war, perception of terrorism as crime and 
nationalism as predictors of support for restrictions of civil 
liberties. As can be seen in Table 1, when controlling for other 
background variables, the perceived threat, nationalism 
and the perception of terrorism as war explained significant 
unique variance in support for restrictions of civil liberties. 
As perceived threat, nationalism and perception of terrorism 
as war increased, so did support for the restrictions of civil 
liberties; the former link additionally confirms the findings 
from Study 1.
Subsequently, path analyses were conducted to test a 
potentially viable mediational model discussed above, 
and to explore whether the potentially viable mediator 
met the remaining requirement, i.e. that the direct effect 
of  perception of terrorism as war would be reduced 
or eliminated when controlling for nationalism, while 
predicting support for restrictions of civil liberties. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, nationalism partially mediated the 
effects of perception of terrorism as war on support for 
restrictions of civil liberties. Perception of terrorism as war 
was associated with greater nationalism that was in turn 
associated with greater support for restrictions of civil 
liberties. Controlling for nationalism significantly reduced, 
but did not fully eliminate, the direct effect of perception 
of terrorism as war on support for restrictions of civil 
liberties (Sobel test = 2.44, p < .01). This result means that 
a proportion of the effect of perception of terrorism as war 
was direct, but another significant proportion of the effect 
was mediated through nationalism.
The results suggest that “nationalists” tend to see 
terrorism as an external phenomenon and terrorist group 
as a clear-cut enemy, which should be neutralized with the 
means and methods of conventional warfare. Moreover, 
apart from the fight on the frontline, they are concerned 
with securing the rear or the headquarters, that is, the state, 
due to the conviction that the enemy may lurk around every 
corner. Certainly, any suspensions of civil liberties hit all 
residents of the country, thus, both the “loyal citizens”, and 
public enemies as well as their allies. Nevertheless, all this 
is considered to be the costs, which the society must pay 
in the name of security. Besides, people with nationalist 
and pro-state worldviews usually maintain that those who 
lead an honest and law-abiding life should not be afraid of 
any restrictions because they have nothing to hide. This is a 
quite frequent argument when it comes to the proposals of 
tightening the law, so it is understandably used by people, 
who declare their love for the country and claim superiority 
of their own nation over others. 
General Discussion
Study 1 provided evidence for the relationship between 
nationalism perception of terrorist threat and restriction of 
civil liberties. Firstly, the findings showed that high scores 
on the nationalism scale were linked with greater feeling of 
threat than low scores. Secondly, participants high on the 
nationalism scale were decisively in favour of limitation of 
civil liberties. Finally, we found that nationalism mediated 
the relationship between the intensity of perceived terrorist 
threat and support for restriction of civil liberties. Study 
2 showed that nationalism mediated to a large degree the 
Table 1
Standard Multiple Regressions and Standardized Betas Predicting Support for Restrictions on Civil Liberties.
Standardized Betas t p
perceived terrorism threat .316 4.479 .001
nationalism .212 2.845 .005
terrorism as war .464 5.871 .000
terrorism as crime -.055 -.700 .485
gender .079 1.121 .264
age .024 .326 .745
R2 = .46
Figure 2. Influence of nationalism on the relationship between perception of terrorism 









All effects were calculated controlling for gender and age. Path coefficients are stan-
dardized regression weights.
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direct effect of perception of terrorism as war on support 
for restrictions of civil liberties, whereas there was no such 
mediation in case of perception of terrorism as crime. 
The feeling of threat among participants high on 
the nationalism scale seems to support the conclusions 
drawn from earlier results: they are indeed considerably 
concerned that terrorism poses a serious threat to their 
country, its cherished social order and its citizens. 
As shown in many studies, for people with strong national 
affiliation the country is almost constantly in danger 
irrespective of any real conflict or threat (cf. e.g. Kosterman 
& Feshbach, 1989; Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendoorn, 
2003). In the same vein, Jost and his colleagues (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) found that political 
conservatism (which is related to authoritarianism, 
dogmatism, and right-wing ideologies) correlates with 
anxiety, especially death anxiety and fear of threat and 
loss. According to those authors, conservatives are 
generally more sensitive to the things which threaten the 
stability of the social system. And, as shown by Dekker and 
colleagues (2003), both conservatives and, especially, 
right-wingers, score significantly higher on nationalism 
than left wingers; likewise conservatives frequently tend 
to perceive the world as a threatening, dangerous place 
that teeters on the brink of destruction from the forces 
of evil. Therefore, we think it is generalized anxiety that 
can account for the result. Jost and colleagues found also 
a correlation between conservatism and fear of change, 
which may additionally explain the link between 
nationalism and feeling of threat that appeared in our study. 
Besides, there can be a certain “social feedback” between 
perception of terrorist threat and the strength of national 
attitudes: on the one hand people high on the nationalism 
scale tend to feel higher threat than people low on the 
nationalism scale, and then, in the face of increased actual 
threat following a terrorist attack, this perception would 
further increase. On the other hand, a stronger perception 
of the threat produces stronger national attitudes. 
Furthermore, our results also showed that participants 
high on the nationalism scale also strongly supported the 
possible suspension of civil liberties. By and large, the 
question of prevention usually translates into the question 
of the balance between security and freedom. This was 
elegantly described by Bauman (1997) in his seminal book 
Postmodernity and its discontents. Bauman argues that to 
lead happy and satisfactory lives, people must counterbalance 
both security and freedom, which is a considerably difficult 
task. In other words, if we want to feel more secure we 
have to sacrifice some part of our freedom. In political 
terms, one could say that in democracy the fight against 
terrorism is thorny. If Western democracies introduced, 
for example, methods of surveillance common in Stalinist 
Soviet Union, such as house searches, severe censorship, 
police raids, wiretapping, interception of mail, anonymous 
denunciations and so forth, the problem with international 
terrorism within their borders would soon disappear. And 
the State would keep the monopoly of violence on which it 
is premised. Nevertheless, in democracy the state is neither 
capable to act according to such rules, nor is it endowed 
with such trust; at least, not by the majority. 
As has been mentioned, people scoring high on 
nationalism are simultaneously more anxious than people 
scoring low on nationalism and they express stronger pro-
state attitudes. A higher fear of change and/or fear of death 
engender a motivation to defend one’s cultural worldview, 
i.e. the social order he or she supports that, in turn, instigates 
a need for control over those who threaten the status of 
cherished social order (Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, one 
can suspect that, in the name of security, they would allow 
the state to restrict their own civil liberties because, by the 
same token, the state could control not only its external, but 
also internal, foes, which more often than not, seem to be 
more dangerous. 
Furthermore, a number of findings from the research 
on terror management (cf. e.g. Mikulincer, Florian, 
& Hirschberger, 2003; Taubman-Ben-Ari, Findler, & 
Miculincer, 2002; Florian, Miculincer, & Hirschberger, 
2002; Śmieja, Kałaska, & Adamczyk, 2006) clearly show 
that establishing and maintaining positive relations with 
others, particularly with the members of one’s own group, 
is one of the important adaptive mechanisms as far as 
primordial anxiety is concerned. Therefore it leads to a 
greater acceptance of group norms, respect for its leaders 
and pressure over those who violate the rules (e.g. Duckitt, 
1989; Citrin, Wong & Duff, 2001, Sidanius & Petrocik, 
2001). Our findings, by showing that nationalism mediates 
the relationship between perception of personal threat and 
support for social control, additionally corroborate such a 
line of thinking. However, although there are direct positive 
effects of seeing counterterrorism both as war and crime 
on the support for social control, nationalism mediates the 
effect only within a “war metaphor”. It suggests certain 
boundary conditions for the mediating role of nationalism 
between different perceptions of the phenomenon of 
terrorism and the support for restriction of civil liberties.
While research on the threat of terrorism and 
counterterrorism strategies has by now focused on the 
perception of the phenomenon of terrorism (e.g. Kruglanski, 
Crenshaw, Post, & Victoroff, 2007) or the perceived images 
of terrorists (e.g. Kossowska, Golec de Zavala, Sekerdej, & 
Kubik, 2010), the present studies examine the role that the 
perception of one’s own national group plays in prediction 
of perceived threat and the relevant reactions. We think 
that these results indicating the mediating role of attitudes 
towards one’s own nation between the perceived threat of 
terrorism and support for the specific counter-terrorism 
actions are promising and thought-provoking, opening 
a path for future investigations aimed at experimental 
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confirmation of the relationship and specifying the 
processes through which it occurs. 
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